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Abstract
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof
mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students’
preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that “equivalence”,
properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes
and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism.
Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice
functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observ-
able law of aggregate demand holds. JEL-classification: C78, D47
Keywords: Matching with contracts; Embedding; College admission; Sub-
stitutes; Observable Substitutes; Group-Strategy-Proofness
1 Introduction
Centralized clearing houses based on the deferred-acceptance mechanism are at the
heart of many successful real-world matching markets (Roth, 1984a; Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez,
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Conference on Economics and Computation (EC16). Chapter 4 of the original paper, has been
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Kojima, Maciej Kotowski, Jordi Masso´, participants of the 2016 Meeting of the Social Choice
and Welfare Society, the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, the 2018 ASSA
meetings, seminar participants at Bocconi University, in Marseille, in Maastricht and at City
University for comments on a previous version of the paper. I gratefully acknowledge financial
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2003; So¨nmez and Switzer, 2013; So¨nmez, 2013). Deferred-acceptance mechanisms
are appealing, because they produce stable outcomes, meaning that no subgroup
of agents can find a mutually beneficial deviation and thus would have a reason
to contract outside the market.1 Moreover, it is safe for the applying side of the
market to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Thus, the mechanism
successfully aggregates the information in the market and levels the playing field
for naive and sophisticated participants.
In some applications, the market does not only match agents, but determines
also the contractual details of the match. In a labor market, firms and work-
ers may have some discretion on how to set the salary. In the cadet-to-branch
match (So¨nmez and Switzer, 2013), cadets can choose between different lengths of
service time in exchange for a higher priority in their branch of choice. In a college
admission problem, students can be admitted with or without a stipend. These
markets can be understood as hybrids between matching markets and auctions and
have first been analyzed in the seminal paper of Kelso and Crawford (1982), with
later important extensions by Roth (1984b); Fleiner (2003); Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005); Hatfield and Kojima (2009) among others. In a general model of many-to-
one matching with endogenous contracting, a generalized version of the deferred
acceptance mechanism can be defined, and is stable and group-strategy-proof un-
der the assumption that contracts are substitutes for colleges2 and the law of
aggregate demand holds.3
In many applications of matching models with contracts, there is a natural
ordering on contract terms and it is reasonable to assume that preferences are
monotone with respect to the ordering: In the cadet-to-branch matching model
of So¨nmez and Switzer (2013) the contract-term is the service time in the military
and it is natural to assume that cadets prefer a shorter to a longer service in the
same branch. This assumption is for example made in the analysis of Jagadeesan
(2016). In college admission problems (Hassidim et al., 2017; Abizada and Dur,
2017) with stipends, it is natural to assume that students prefer being admitted
with a stipend to being admitted without a stipend at the same college, or more
generally, being admitted with a higher stipend than a lower stipend at the same
college.4 For the medical match, mechanisms which allow for flexible salaries have
1See Roth (1991) for evidence that clearing houses using unstable mechanisms tend to fail in
practice.
2In the following we call the applying side of the market “students” and the admitting side
of the market “colleges” motivated by the application of college admission. However, the model
equally applies to the other applications mentioned in this introduction.
3This means that if we shrink the choice set of a college, an equal or small number of contracts
will be chosen.
4There is empirical evidence that monotonicity is violated for reported preferences of some
participants in the Israeli psychology match, see Hassidim et al., 2016. But it seems likely that
this monotonicity violations can be attributed to students failing to play the weakly dominant
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been proposed (Crawford, 2008), and it seems reasonable that doctors in these
mechanisms would prefer working for a higher salary rather than a lower salary at
the same hospital.
In this paper we provide a full analysis of matching markets with contracts
where students have monotone preferences.5 Monotonicity means that contract
terms are totally ordered and students’ preferences are monotone with respect
to this ordering. Under the assumption of monotone preferences, we show that
substitutability and the law of aggregate demand are not only sufficient, but also
essentially necessary for the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-proof mech-
anism. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of an equivalent choice profile. A
DA-equivalent choice profile is a choice profile such that the (student-proposing)
deferred-acceptance algorithm produces the same outcome if the original choice
profile is replaced by the equivalent choice profile. The domain of choice profiles
that are (1) DA-equivalent to a choice profile under which contract are substi-
tutes for colleges and the law of aggregate demand holds, and for which (2) the
deferred-acceptance algorithm is stable, turns out to be equivalent to the domain of
choice profiles under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable
law of aggregate demand holds - two notions recently introduced by Hatfield et al.
(2018). Moreover, these choice profiles form a maximal (Cartesian and unitary)
domain for the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanism.
Our result have two important consequences: First, for monotone preferences,
group-strategy-proofness is “for free” in the sense that the maximal domain for
the existence of a strategy-proof and stable mechanism is also maximal for the
existence of a group-strategy-proof and stable mechanism. Second obtain an em-
bedding result in the sense of Jagadeesan (2016) for the class of choice functions
under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of ag-
gregate demand holds. Thus, if attention is restricted to the case of monotone
preferences for students, it is, in some sense without loss of generality to work
with the model of matching with salaries of Kelso and Crawford (1982) rather
than the full matching with contracts model.
1.1 Related Literature
Stable many-to-one matching mechanisms and their incentive properties have been
extensively studied (Hatfield and Kojima, 2010; Chen et al., 2016; Hirata and Kasuya,
2017; Kominers and So¨nmez, 2016; Hatfield et al., 2018). Most papers focus on the
pure matching model or on the matching with contracts model (Hatfield and Milgrom,
2005; Roth, 1984b; Fleiner, 2003). Working with monotone preferences makes our
strategy of revealing preferences truthfully, rather than that they have non-monotone preferences.
5Colleges’ preferences are not necessarily monotone in our analysis.
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model less general than the full matching with contracts model. In particular, all
sufficient conditions for stability and the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-
proof mechanism from the literature on matching with contracts also apply to our
model. However, conditions that are necessary for the general model with con-
tracts are not necessary conditions for the model with monotone preferences. Thus
our results are independent from previous results for the matching with contracts
model. For (group)-strategy-proofness, this is because certain preference manipu-
lations are ruled out by our model. A student must report monotone preferences.
Thus, a student cannot rank being admitted to a college without a stipend above
being admitted to the same college with a stipend. Similarly, weaker conditions
are sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable allocations than those for markets
with non-monotone preferences.6
In recent work, Abizada and Dur (2017) make similar observations and consider
a model of college admissions with stipends where complementarities in contract
terms are present for colleges: In their model three contract terms {t+, t0, t−} are
available, interpreted as admission with stipend, admission without stipend but
with tuition waiver, and admission without either of the two, and the number of
6To illustrate this point, consider a college admission problem of the following kind: There
are two colleges c1, c2 and three students s1, s2, s3. Suppose there are two kinds of contracts: A
student can be admitted with stipend (represented by the contract term ”1”) or without stipend
(represented by the contract term ”0”). The colleges have choice functions induced (in the usual
way) by the following preferences
{(s1, 0), (s2, 0), (s3, 0)} ≻c1 {(s2, 0)} ≻c1 {(s2, 1)} ≻c1 ∅ ≻c1 . . .
{(s1, 0)} ≻c2 {(s3, 0)} ≻c2 ∅ ≻c2 . . .
Suppose student always prefer to be admitted at a college under a stipend to being admitted at
the same college without a stipend. Going through all different cases, one can show that, for any
preferences satisfying this monotonicity assumption, a stable allocation (in the matching with
contracts sense) exists. This changes if students can report non-monotonic preferences. Consider
the following preferences:
(c1, 1) ≻s1 (c2, 1) ≻s1 (c1, 0) ≻s1 (c2, 0) ≻s1 ∅
(c1, 0) ≻s2 (c1, 1) ≻s2 ∅ ≻s2 . . .
(c2, 1) ≻s3 (c1, 1) ≻s3 (c2, 0) ≻s3 (c1, 0) ≻s3 ∅
Student s2 prefers to go to college c1 without a stipend rather than a stipend. Thus, in a stable
allocation it will never be the case that s2 goes to college c1 with a stipend, because otherwise
c1 and s2 could block that allocation. This in turn implies that no stable allocation exists: The
allocation that matches all three students to c1 without stipend is blocked by student s3 and
college c2. Any allocation that matches s1 to c2 without stipend is blocked by students s1, s2 and
s3 being admitted to college c1 without stipend. Any allocation that matches s3 to c2 without
stipend is blocked by student s1 being admitted to college c2 without a stipend. Finally, all
other allocations are either not individually rational or blocked by students s1, s2 and s3 being
admitted to college c1 without a stipend.
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t−-contracts signed by a college constraints the number of t+-contracts it signs.
Importantly, students have monotone preferences in these contract terms. The
model is a special case of ours. In particular, the result for “Max-Min Respon-
sive” preferences can be obtained as a special case of ours and for this case their
strategy-proofness result can be strengthened to group-strategy-proofness. How-
ever, Abizada and Dur (2017) also analyze pairwise-stable outcomes and this part
of their analysis does not have a counter-part in our paper.
Our original working paper (Schlegel, 2016) contained a version of our maximal
domain result for a model of matching with contracts where also colleges’ choice
functions are monotone in contract-terms. Technically the two maximal domain
results are independent. However, the adaption to obtain the previous version
of the theorem from the current one are minimal.7 The current version of the
maximality result can also be obtained with a similar proof as the one in the
previous version.8 For the original version of the theorem we refer the interested
reader to the original version of the working paper.
While preparing the current version of the paper, Hatfield et al. (2018) released
a new version of their working paper, where the authors also analyze preferences
restrictions such as monotonicity and show that their analysis of observable substi-
tutes and the observable law of aggregate demand extend to restricted preferences
domains such as monotone preferences. Their additional work allows us to shorten
the proof of the “sufficiency part” of our maximal domain result considerably. It
now suffices to show that observable substitutability and the observable law of
aggregate demand for monotone preferences (which for choice functions that are
monotone in contract terms, are equivalent to the virtual substitutability and vir-
tual law of aggregate demand conditions from our original working paper) imply
DA-equivalence to a profile of choice functions under which contracts are substi-
tutes and the law of aggregate demand holds. We emphasize however that our
result for monotone preferences is stronger than the new result in Hatfield et al.
(2018) in the following regards: We obtain the stronger incentive property of
group-strategy-proofness instead of just strategy-proofness.9 Moreover, the ”non-
manipulability” axiom is redundant under monotone preferences.10 Finally, the
explicit construction of an equivalent choice profile allows for a natural interpre-
7One has to make sure that in the “necessity part” of the maximal domain proof, the profile
of unitary choice functions for the other colleges can be chosen to be induced by monotone
preferences.
8The main difference is that now stability of the deferred acceptance algorithm for the original
choice profile has to be assumed on top of DA-equivalence.
9The mechanisms fall outside of the domain defined by Barbera` et al. (2016) on which
strategy-proofness is equivalent to group-strategy-proofness. Thus, it is not sufficient to only
show strategy-proofness and invoke the result of Barbera` et al. (2016).
10The “non-manipulability” axiom is discussed in more detail in Remark 1.
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tation of the conditions of observable substitutability and the observable law of
aggregate demand. In particular, our result can be interpreted as an embedding
result for the matching with contracts model into a Kelso-Crawford economy in
the sense of Jagadeesan (2016).
2 Model and Known Results
2.1 Model
There are two finite disjoint sets of agents, a set of colleges C and a set of
students S. There is a finite set of possible contract-terms T which are totally
ordered by ⊲. Colleges can accept students under different bilateral contracts.
The set of possible contracts is X ⊆ C×S×T . For a contract x ∈ X , we denote
by xC ∈ C the college involved in x, by xS ∈ S the student involved in X , and by
xT ∈ T the contract term involved in x. We write xT D x
′
T whenever xT ⊲ x
′
T or
x = x′.
Each college c has a choice function Chc : 2
Xc → 2Xc that from each set Y ⊆ Xc
chooses a subset of contracts. Each college can only sign one contract with any
given student, i.e. for each x, y ∈ Chc(Y ) with x 6= y we have xS 6= yS. Throughout
this paper, we assume that all considered choice functions satisfy the irrelevance
of rejected contracts (IRC) (Aygu¨n and So¨nmez, 2013), which means that for
all Y ⊆ X , x ∈ X \ Y ,
x /∈ Chc(Y ∪ {x})⇒ Chc(Y ) = Chc(Y ∪ {x}).
We also define a rejection function Rc : 2
Xc → 2Xc by Rc(Y ) := Y \ Chc(Y ). We
denote the set of all choice functions for college c ∈ C that satisfy IRC, by Cc.
Each student s has preferences s over different contracts involving him, and
an outside option which we denote by “∅”. We make the following assumption on
students’ preferences:
1. Preferences are strict, for x, x′ ∈ X with x′S = xS, we have
x 6= x′ ⇒ x ≻xS x
′ or x′ ≻xS x,
and
x ≻xS ∅ or ∅ ≻xS x.
2. Preferences are monotone in contract terms, for each x, x′ ∈ X with xS =
x′S we have
xT ⊲ x
′
T ⇒ x ≻xS x
′.
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We denote the set of all strict and monotone preferences for student s ∈ S byRs. A
market is a pair (Ch,) consisting of a choice profile Ch = (Chc)c∈C ∈×c∈C Cc
and a preference profile = (s)s∈S ∈×s∈SRs.
An allocation is a set Y ⊆ X that contains at most one contract per student.
We denote the set of allocations by A. In the following it will be useful to define
for each set of contracts Y ⊆ Xc with a college c the allocation
Y min := {y ∈ Y : ∄y′ ∈ Y, y′S = yS, yT ⊲ y
′
T}
of contracts that gives each student the worst contract among the contract in Y ,11
and the set
U(Y ) := {x ∈ Xc : xT D yT for some y ∈ Y with xS = yS}
of contracts, not necessarily in Y , which are as least as good for the involved
student as his worst contract in Y .
Finally, an allocation Y is
individually rational in (Ch,) if for each c ∈ C, we have Yc = Chc(Y ),
and for each y ∈ Y we have y ≻yS ∅,
blocked in (Ch,) if there are c ∈ C and an allocation Z with Zc 6= Yc,
such that Zc = Chc(Y ∪ Z) and for each z ∈ Zc we have z zS YzS ,
stable in (Ch,) if it is individually rational and not blocked.
2.2 Mechanisms
A mechanism (for the students) is a mapping from preference profiles to allo-
cations M :×s∈SRs → A. Mechanism M is strategy-proof if it is a weakly
dominant strategy for students to report their true preferences to the mechanism,
i.e. for each s ∈ S, −s∈×s′∈S\{s}Rs′ and s,′s∈ Rs we have
M(s,−s) s M(
′
s,−s).
Mechanism M is group-strategy-proof if for each S ′ ⊆ S, −S′∈×s∈S\S′ Rs
and S′,
′
S′∈×s∈S′ Rs, there is a s′ ∈ S ′ with
M(S′ ,−S′) s′ M(
′
S′,−S′).
Let Ch be a choice profile. Mechanism M is Ch-stable if for each ∈×s∈SRs
allocation M() is stable in (Ch,).
11Note that the worst contract for a student with a given college c from some set is the same
under all monotone preferences.
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2.3 Examples
Several examples from applied marked design fit into our model. Later in Sec-
tion 3.4, we will show how our results apply to these models.
2.3.1 Job matching
A finite Kelso-Crawford economy consists of a finite set of firms F , a finite
set of workers W , a finite set of salaries Σ ⊆ R++ and a profile ui∈F∪W of utility
functions, where for each f ∈ F , utility function uf assigns to each W
′ ⊆ W
and p ∈ ΣW
′
a utility level uf(W
′, p) and for each W ′ ⊆ W , uf(W
′, ·) is strictly
decreasing in salaries, and for each w ∈ W , the utility function uw assigns to each
(f, p) ∈ F ×Σ a utility level uw(f, p) and a utility level to the outside option uw(∅)
such that for each w ∈ W , uw(f, ·) is strictly increasing in salaries.
The model fits in our framework with C = F , S = W , T = Σ, xT ⊲ x
′
T ⇔
xT > x
′
T , X = F ×W × Σ, choice functions are defined by
Chf(Y ) = max
Y ′⊆Y min
uf(Y
′),
and preferences (w)w∈W are induced by utility functions (uw)w∈W .
Note that the constructed market with contracts (Ch,) does not only satisfy
monotonicity of students’ preferences, but also monotonicity of colleges’ choice
function, where for c ∈ C, Chc is monotone in contract-terms if for each
Y ⊆ XC we have
Chc(Y ) ⊆ Y
min.
2.3.2 College admission with stipend
A college admission problem with stipends of Hassidim et al. (2017), consists
of set of colleges C, a set of students S, a finite set of contract terms T ⊆ N, where
each t ∈ T correspond to a funding level, a set of contracts X ⊆ C × S × T and
preferences (i)i∈C∪S for colleges and students. Preferences of a student s are over
Xs ∪ {∅} and monotone with respect to >. Preferences of colleges are responsive
according to quotas ((qtc)t∈T )c∈C with t < t
′ ⇒ qtc ≤ q
t′
c where q
t
c is the number of
seats available with funding level t or lower and a profile of master lists (≫c)c∈C
which are linear orders over T ∪ {∅} such that allocations that do not violate the
quota and only differ in contract terms, are ranked responsively according to the
master-list(the specifications accommodates different possibilities of choosing the
contract terms, so preferences and induced choice functions can be non-monotone,
for the full details see Hassidim et al., 2017).
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2.3.3 Cadet to branch matching
A cadet-to-branch matching problem of So¨nmez (2013), consist of a set of
cadets I, a set of branches B, a finite set of service times t1 < t2 < . . . < tk, a
profile of order of merit lists (≫b)b∈B which are strict priority orderings over I,
and a profile of capacities (q1b , q
2
b )b∈B ⊆ (Z
2
≥0)
B. Choice functions of branches are
“bid for your career (BfYC) choice functions” which can be informally described as
follows (for a formal description see the original paper of So¨nmez, 2013): Branches
choose the q1b highest ranked cadets according to ≫b and selects for each of them
the contract with the shortest service time available and, afterwards choose the q2b
next ranked cadets according to≫b and selects for each of them the contract with
the longest service time available. The model fits in our framework with C = B,
S = I, T = {t1, . . . , tk}, where xT ⊲ x
′
T ⇔ xT < x
′
T , X = C × S × T .
2.4 Stable Allocations
In general, a stable allocation does not need to exist for our model. A sufficient
condition for stability is that contracts are substitutes for colleges, i.e. if a contract
is chosen from some set of contracts, then this contract is also chosen from each
subset of that set of contracts.
Substitutability (Roth, 1984b; Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005): For each Y ⊆ X
and each x, z ∈ X \ Y ,
x ∈ Chc(Y ∪ {x, z})⇒ x ∈ Chc(Y ∪ {x}).
Not only is substitutability sufficient for the existence of a stable allocation
but it also guarantees that the set of stable allocations has a lattice structure.
If contracts are substitutes for colleges, then the set of stable allocation forms a
lattice with respect to the preferences of students (Blair, 1988). In particular,
there is a unique stable allocation that is most preferred by all students among all
stable allocations. We call this allocation the student-optimal stable allocation.
It can be found by the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm that is defined
as follows.
1. Each student applies under his favorite acceptable and unrejected contract
or stays alone, if he finds no unrejected contract acceptable.
2. Each college tentatively accepts the contracts it chooses among the proposed
contracts and rejects all other contracts.
3. If no applications has been rejected in the current round, the chosen contracts
form the final allocation. If some applications are rejected we repeat.
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We denote the outcome of the DA-algorithm in market (Ch,) by DA(Ch,).
The deferred acceptance mechanism for Ch assigns to each ∈×s∈SRs the
outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm DA(Ch,).
In general, the deferred acceptance algorithm does not need to converge to a
stable allocation. It could be the case that a student s applies in some round to
some college c which tentatively accepts the student, but another college c′ wants
to recall an application made by s to c′ in an earlier round that c′ had previously
rejected. Substitutability rules out this possibility, since it guarantees that colleges
will never want to recall applications made in previous rounds. Later we will see
that also weaker conditions than substitutability guarantee the convergence to a
stable allocation.In the following, we call a choice profile ChDA-stable if for each
∈×s∈SRs, allocation DA(Ch,) is stable.
Student-optimality is related to group-strategy-proofness. Under substitutabil-
ity and the following additional condition on the colleges’ choice functions the de-
ferred acceptance mechanism is group-strategy-proof.
Law of Aggregate Demand (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005): For Y, Z ⊆ X we
have
Z ⊆ Y ⇒ |Chc(Y )| ≥ |Chc(Z)|.
The following proposition summarizes known results about side-optimal stable
allocations, the invariance of the set of matched students in stable allocations (the
rural hospitals theorem), and group-strategy-proofness.
Proposition 1 (Kelso and Crawford, 1982; Blair, 1988; Hatfield and Milgrom,
2005; Hatfield and Kojima, 2009).
1. If contracts are substitutes for colleges, then the deferred acceptance algorithm
converges to a stable allocation that is most preferred by all students among
all stable allocations.
2. If choice functions satisfy, moreover, the law of aggregate demand, then
(a) the set of accepted students is the same in all stable allocations and each
college accepts the same number of students in each stable allocation,
(b) the deferred acceptance mechanism is group-strategy-proof.
3 Results
3.1 Equivalent Choice Functions
It is a natural question whether the conditions of Section 2.4 for the stability and
group-strategy-proofness of the deferred acceptance mechanism are also necessary.
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Next we provide a counter example showing that substitutability and the law of
aggregate demand are not necessary for the deferred-acceptance mechanism to
be stable and group-strategy-proof. The choice function example will have the
following structure: There is one college c for which contracts are not substitutes.
For each college except for c, contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate
demand holds. However, c’s choice function can be replaced by another choice
function, such that
1. the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is the same under the
original choice profile and the profile where c’s choice function is replaced,
2. under the replacing choice function, contracts are substitutes for c and the
law of aggregate demand holds.
The deferred acceptance mechanism is stable and group-strategy-proof both for
the original market and the market where we have replaced c’s choice function by
the other choice function.
Example 1. We reconsider the college c1 from the example in Footnote 8. Let
x = (c1, s1, 0), x
′ = (c1, s1, 1), y = (c1, s2, 0), y
′ = (c1, s2, 1), z = (c1, s3, 0), z
′ =
(c1, s2, 1). Let X = {x, x
′, y, y′, z, z′} and 1 ⊲ 0. The choice function of the college
is
Chc1(Y ) =


{x, y, z}, if {x, y, z} ⊆ Y,
{y}, if y ∈ Y and x /∈ Y or z /∈ Y,
{y′}, if y′ ∈ Y, y /∈ Y,
∅, else.
Now consider the alternative choice function Ch′c1 defined by:
Ch′c1(Y ) =


{y}, if y ∈ Y,
{y′}, if y′ ∈ Y, y /∈ Y,
∅, else.
Note that under Chc1 contracts are not substitutes as x ∈ Chc1(X) = {x, y, z}
but x /∈ Chc1(X \ {z}) = {y} and that under Ch
′
c1
contracts are substitutes.
Suppose colleges C \ {c1} have choice functions Ch−c1 = (Chc)c 6=c1 under
which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds. Define
Ch := (Chc1, Ch−c1) and Ch
′ := (Ch′c1 , Ch−c1). Let ∈×s∈SRs. We show that
the deferred acceptance algorithm process in the market (Ch,) and the deferred
acceptance algorithm in the market (Ch′,) converge to the same allocation. Ob-
serve that the choice functions Chc1 and Ch
′
c1
differ only for sets Y ⊆ X with
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{x, y, z} ⊆ Y . In particular, for the deferred acceptance algorithm to differ in the
two markets, student s2 must apply to c1 under contract y during the deferred
acceptance algorithm in (Ch,). Note however that before s2 applies to c1 under
contract y, he applies to c1 under contract y
′, as y′T ⊲ yT . But once the process ten-
tatively matches s2 to c1 under contract y
′, the college will not subsequently drop
the contract or accept additional contracts. Thus, s2 will never apply to c1 under
contract y. Hence, the deferred acceptance algorithm in the two markets converge
to the same allocation, which is the student-optimal stable allocation in (Ch′,).
By Proposition 1, the deferred acceptance mechanism for Ch′ is group-strategy-
proof and Ch′-stable. It is also easy to see that, as Chc1 is induced by monotone
preferences, the mechanism is Ch-stable as well. Thus, there is a Ch-stable and
group-strategy-proof mechanism.
The example motivates the following definition.12
DA-equivalence: Two choice profiles Ch and Ch′ are deferred-acceptance-equivalent
if for each ∈×s∈SRs we have DA(Ch,) = DA(Ch′,).
From this definition and Proposition 1, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2. If Ch is DA-equivalent to a profile under which contracts are
substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds, then the deferred acceptance
mechanism for Ch is group-strategy-proof.
If contracts are substitutes under the equivalent choice profile, the deferred
acceptance mechanism is stable for the equivalent choice profile. It is not in gen-
eral true that the deferred acceptance mechanism is also stable for the original
choice profile. The outcome can fail to be stable, if colleges would like to recall
contracts that they had rejected during a previous round of the deferred accep-
tance algorithm. In Hatfield et al. (2018) propose a condition on choice functions,
called observable substitutability, that rules out exactly the problem that during
the deferred acceptance algorithm colleges would like to recall contracts. We next
introduce this property formally and derive some useful implications.
In the following, a sequence of contracts x1, x2, . . . , xτ is generated from
monotone preferences if for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ and each x ∈ X with xS = x
t
S and
xT ⊲ x
t
T , we have x ∈ {x
1, . . . , xt−1}. A sequence x1, x2, . . . , xτ is observable
under Chc if for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ −1 we have x
t+1
S /∈ [Chc{x
1, . . . , xt}]S. Then observable
12A similar notion has been introduced independently by Jagadeesan (2016). However, since
Jagadeesan (2016) does not assume monotonicity on student preferences, his notion of DA-
equivalence is much stronger. Without monotonicity, DA-equivalence requires that choices coin-
cide on all sets of contracts which contain at most one contract per student. (see Theorem 1 of
Jagadeesan, 2016). With monotonicity the choices only have to coincide at some of these sets of
contracts.
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substitutability for monotone preferences is defined as follows:
Observable Substitutability (Hatfield et al., 2018): A choice function Chc is
observably substitutable for monotone preferences if for each observable sequence
x1, x2, . . . , xτ under Chc that is generated from monotone preferences, we have
Rc{x
1, . . . xt} ⊆ Rc{x
1, . . . , xt+1} for each 0 < t < τ.
Similarly, we can define an observable version of the law of aggregate demand.
Observable Law of Aggregate Demand (Hatfield et al., 2018): A choice func-
tions Chc satisfies the observable law of aggregate demand for monotone prefer-
ences if for each observable sequence under Chc that is generated from monotone
preferences, we have
|Chc{x
1, . . . xt}| ≤ |Chc{x
1, . . . , xt+1}| for each 0 < t < τ.
Since we exclusively deal with monotone preferences, from now one we drop the
term ”for monotone preferences.” However, we emphasize that observable sub-
stitutability for monotone preferences is a weaker notion than observable sub-
stitutability for general preferences. In the following, we call a set of contracts
Y ⊆ Xc observable under Chc, if there is a sequence of contracts x
1, . . . , x|Y |
that is observable under Chc and generated from monotone preferences such that
Y = {x1, . . . , x|Y |}. We call Y˜ ⊆ Y ⊆ Xc a maximal observable subset of Y
under Chc, if there is no observable set Y
′ under Chc with Y˜ ( Y ′ ⊆ Y . It
is straightforward to see that substitutability (the law of aggregate demand) for
observable sequences (generated by monotone preferences) implies substitutability
(the law of aggregate demand) for observable sets. We prove a stronger version of
this result, which will be useful in the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 3. If contracts are observable substitutes under Chc, then for each Y ⊆ Xc
there is a unique maximal observable subset of Y under Chc. In this case, for
Z ⊆ Y ⊆ Xc, let Z˜ ⊆ Z and Y˜ ⊆ Y be the unique maximal observable subsets
under Chc. Then
Rc(Z˜) ⊆ Rc(Y˜ ).
If moreover, the observable law of aggregate demand holds for Chc, then
|Chc(Z˜)| ≤ |Chc(Y˜ )|.
Proof. First we prove the existence of a unique maximal observable subset. The
proof strategy is due to Hirata and Kasuya (2014). We use induction on the size
of the set Y .
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Induction Basis: If |Y | = 0, then Y = ∅ and trivially Y˜ = ∅ = Y is the only
maximal observable subset of Y .
Induction Assumption: For each Y ⊆ Xs with |Y | ≤ n there exists a unique
maximal observable subset of Y under Chc.
Induction Step: Consider maximal sequences x1, . . . , xT and y1, . . . , yT
′
in Y
that are observable under Chc and generated from monotone preferences. We
show that {x1, . . . , xT} = {y1, . . . , y
T ′}. Suppose not. Then w.l.o.g. there is a
1 ≤ t ≤ T ′ with yt /∈ {x1, . . . , xT}. Choose the smallest such t and consider
the set Y ′ := Y \ {yt}. Since yt /∈ {x1, . . . , xT }, by the induction assumption
{x1, . . . , xT} is the unique maximal observable subset of Y ′ under Chc. Now
consider, the sequence y1, . . . , yt−1. Observe that {y1, . . . , yt−1} ⊆ Y ′ and that
this sequence is generated from monotone preferences and is observable under
Chc. Extend y
1, . . . yt−1 to a maximal sequence y1, . . . , yt−1, y˜t, . . . , y˜T˜ in Y ′ that
is observable under Chc and generated from monotone preferences. By the in-
duction assumption, we have {y1 . . . , yt−1, y˜t, . . . , y˜T˜} = {x1, . . . , xT}. Further-
more we have ytS ∈ Chc{x
1, . . . , xT}S, since otherwise x
1, . . . , xT , yt would be
observable under Chc, and, as t was chosen to be the smallest index such that
yt /∈ {x1, . . . , xT}, x1, . . . , xT , yt would be generated from monotone preferences.
Observe furthermore, that by observability of y1, . . . , yt, we have U({yt}) \ {yt} ⊆
Rc({y
1, . . . , yt−1}). By observable substitutability, we have
U({yt}) \ {yt} ⊆ Rc({y
1, . . . , yt−1}) ⊆ Rc{y
1 . . . , yt−1, y˜t, . . . , y˜T˜}
and therefore ytS /∈ Chc{y
1 . . . , yt−1, y˜t, . . . , y˜T˜}S. But this contradicts
{y1 . . . , yt−1, y˜t, . . . , y˜T˜} = {x1, . . . , xT}.
Now consider Z ⊆ Y ⊆ Xc and let Z˜ ⊆ Z and Y˜ ⊆ Y be the unique maximal
observable subsets under Chc. Let z
1, . . . , z|Z˜| be an observable sequence, gener-
ated from monotone preferences such that Z˜ = {z1, . . . , z|Z˜|}. Maximally extend
the sequence to a sequence z1, . . . , z|Z˜|, z|Z˜|+1, . . . , zY˜ with z|Z˜|+1, . . . , zY˜ ∈ Y˜ that
is observable and generated from monotone preferences. Since Y˜ is observable, we
have Y˜ = {z1, . . . , z|Z˜|, z|Z˜|+1, . . . , zY˜ }. Thus observable substitutability applied to
the sequence {z1, . . . , z|Z˜|, z|Z˜|+1, . . . , zY˜ } implies
Rc(Z˜) ⊆ Rc(Y˜ ),
and the observable law of aggregate demand applied to {z1, . . . , z|Z˜|, z|Z˜|+1, . . . , zY˜ }
implies
|Chc(Z˜)| ≤ |Chc(Y˜ )|.
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Another consequence of observable substitutability is that the deferred accep-
tance mechanisms is stable and the proposed contracts during the algorithm form
an observable set. The following lemma is due to Hatfield et al. (2018).13
Lemma 4. Let (Ch,) be a market such that contracts are observable substitutes.
1. Let Y 1 ⊆ Y 2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Y T ⊆ X such that Y t is the set of proposed contracts
up to round t during the deferred acceptance algorithm in (Ch,). Then for
each c ∈ C, the sets Y 1c , . . . , Y
T
c are observable under Chc,
2. DA(Ch,) is stable.
With the two lemmata, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5. For a profile of choice functions Ch = (Chc)c∈C the following are
equivalent:
1. Under Ch contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of ag-
gregate demand holds.
2. Ch is DA-stable and DA-equivalent to a choice profile Ch′ under which con-
tracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds.
Moreover, for each c ∈ C the choice function Ch′c can be chosen to be monotone
in contract terms and its construction only depends on Chc and is independent of
Ch−c.
Proof. First we prove that 1.⇒ 2.We define for each choice function Chc a second
choice function Ch′c that we call the virtual choice function for Chc. For each
Y ⊆ Xc let Y
∨ ⊆ U(Y ) be the, by Lemma 3 well-defined, maximal subset of U(Y )
that is observable under Chc. We define Ch
′
c : 2
Xc → 2Xc by
Ch′c(Y ) :=
{
x ∈ Y min : xS ∈ Chc(Y
∨)S
}
.
First note that Ch′c satisfies our assumptions on choice functions: By definition
Ch′c(Y ) ⊆ Y
min ⊆ Y , and since Y min contains at most one contract per student,
also Ch′c(Y ) contains at most one contract per student. The IRC condition for Ch
′
c
will follow from substitutability and the law of aggregate (see Aygu¨n and So¨nmez,
2013) or Ch′c which we will establish next.
13The result is Proposition A.1 in Hatfield et al. (2018). Their proof is for the case of gen-
eral preferences for students and with the notion of observable substitutability that applies to
general preferences, i.e. when observable sequences are not necessarily generated from monotone
preferences. However, the proof applied verbatim also to the case of monotone preferences for
students where observable substitutability is with regard to observable sequences generated from
monotone preferences.
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Let Z ⊆ Y ⊆ Xc. Note that U(Z) ⊆ U(Y ). Thus by Lemma 3, we have
Rc(Z
∨) ⊆ Rc(Y
∨) and |Chc(Z
∨)| ≤ |Chc(Y
∨)|. Immediately from this, we obtain
the law of aggregate demand for Ch′c, as
|Ch′c(Z)| = |Chc(Z
∨)| ≤ |Chc(Y
∨)| = |Ch′c(Y )|.
To show that contracts are substitutes under Ch′c, first note that, by definition,
Y \ (Y )min ⊆ R′c(Y ). Thus it suffices to show that for x ∈ Y
min ∩ R′c(Z) we have
x ∈ R′c(Y ). First note that x ∈ R
′
c(Z) ∩ Y
min implies that x ∈ Zmin and therefore
xS /∈ Ch
′
c(Z)S = Chs(Z
∨)S. Thus U({x}) ⊆ Rc(Z
∨) ⊆ Rc(Y
∨) and therefore
xS /∈ Ch
′
c(Y )S = Chc(Y
∨)S. Hence x ∈ R
′
c(Y ). Thus contracts are substitutes
under Ch′c.
Next observe that if Y is observable under Chc, then by definition Y = U(Y ) =
Y ∨. Moreover, by observable substitutability of Chc and observability of Y , we
have Chc(Y ) ⊆ Y
min. Thus if Y is observable under Chc, then Ch
′
c(Y ) = Chc(Y ).
Thus, for each ∈×s∈SRs, by the first part of Lemma 4, we have DA(Ch′,) =
DA(Ch,), and by the second part of Lemma 4, allocation DA(Ch,) is stable
in (Ch,).
Note furthermore that Ch′c is monotone by construction, since for each Y , we
have Chc(Y ) ⊆ Y
min.
Next we show that 2. ⇒ 1. Let Ch be DA-equivalent to Ch′ such that under
Ch′ contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand and such that
DA(Ch, ·) is Ch-stable. Let c ∈ C and consider a sequence x1, . . . , xT that is
observable under Chc and generated from monotone preferences. We show that
Ch′c{x
1, . . . , xT } = Chc{x
1, . . . , xT}. Since under Ch′c contracts are substitutes
and the law of aggregate demand holds, this will imply observable substitutability
and the observable law of aggregate demand under Chc. In the following, we
denote by 0∈×s∈SRs a profile such that no contract is acceptable, and for
1 ≤ t ≤ T we denote by t∈×s∈SRs a preference profile such that x ≻txS ∅ for
x ∈ {x1, . . . , xt} and ∅ ≻txS x for x /∈ {x
1, . . . , xt}. First note that
∅ = Ch′c(∅) = DA(Ch
′,0) = DA(Ch′,0) = Chs(∅).
We now show that if for 0 ≤ τ < T we have
Ch′c{x
1, . . . , xt} = DA(Ch′,t) = DA(Ch,t) = Chc{x
1, . . . , xt}
for each 0 ≤ t ≤ τ , then
Ch′c{x
1, . . . , xτ} = DA(Ch′,τ ) = DA(Ch,τ ) = Chc{x
1, . . . , xτ}.
Since Chc{x
1, . . . , xt} = Ch′c{x
1, . . . , xt} for 0 ≤ t < τ , observability of x1, . . . , xτ
under Chc implies observability of x
1, . . . , xτ under Ch′c. Let Y be the set of
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proposed contract during the deferred acceptance mechanism in (Ch′,τ ) and note
that by Lemma 4, is observable under Ch′. Moreover, Y is a maximal observable
subset of the set of acceptable contracts under τ , since Ch′c(Y ) = DA(Ch
′,τ )
by (observable) substitutability of Ch′c. By construction, the set of acceptable
contracts under τ is {x1, . . . , xτ}. As {x1, . . . , xτ} is observable under Ch′c and
Y is a maximal observable subset of {x1, . . . , xτ} Ch′c, Lemma 3 applied to Ch
′
c
implies Y = {x1, . . . , xτ}. Thus, Ch′c{x
1, . . . xτ} = DA(Ch′,τ ). Next we show
that Chc(Y ) = DA(Ch,
τ ). Suppose not. Then Chc(Y ) blocks DA(Ch,
τ ).
But this contradicts the stability of DA(Ch, ·). Hence by DA-equivalence
Ch′c{x
1, . . . xτ} = DA(Ch′,τ ) = DA(Ch,) = Chc{x
1, . . . xτ}.
3.2 A Maximal Domain Result
An immediate consequence of our Theorem 5 is that DA-stability and DA-equivalence
to profile such that contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of group-strategy-proof and
stable mechanism, in the following sense: In the following a choice domain is a set
of choice profiles D ⊆×c∈C Cc. A choice domain D is Cartesian if D =×c∈C Dc
where Dc ⊆ Cc for each college c ∈ C. A choice function Chc for college c is unit
demand if |Chc(Y )| ≤ 1 for all Y ⊆ Xc. A choice domain is unitary if it includes
all profiles of unit demand choice functions. We obtain the following result which
is a direct consequence of our Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 in Hatfield et al. (2018):
Corollary 6. The choice domain of choice profiles that are DA-stable and DA-
equivalent to a profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate
demand holds is a maximal unitary, Cartesian domain for the existence of a stable
and group-strategy-proof mechanism and for the existence of a stable and strategy-
proof-mechanism.
Proof. LetD be the domain of choice profiles that are DA-stable and DA-equivalent
to a profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand
holds. Let Ch ∈ D. By DA-stability of Ch, DA(Ch, ·) is Ch-stable and by Propo-
sition 2, DA(Ch, ·) is group-strategy-proofness. Moreover, by Theorem 5, domain
D is unitary and Cartesian.
To show maximality, note that by Theorem 5, under Ch contracts are observ-
able substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds. Theorem 6 of
Hatfield et al. (2018) implies that there is no Cartesian and unitary domainD′ with
D ( D′ such that for each Ch ∈ D′ there exists a Ch-stable and strategy-proof
mechanism. In particular, there is no such domain such that for each Ch ∈ D′
there exists a Ch-stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism.
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Remark 1. Hatfield et al. (2018) prove that the domain of all choice profiles under
which contracts are observable substitutes, the observable law of aggregate demand
holds and which satisfy a property called non-manipulability, is a maximal unitary
Cartesian domain for the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism. Non-
manipulability requires that for each profile in the domain the deferred-acceptance
mechanism is strategy-proof on the domain of preference profiles where only con-
tracts with a given college c are acceptable. Whereas this property is in general
independent of the other two properties, our Corollary 6 implies that this prop-
erty is implied by observable substitutability and the observable law of aggregate
demand for monotone preferences.
3.3 An embedding result
As a second consequence of Theorem 5, we obtain an embedding result. In re-
cent work Jagadeesan (2016) shows that for BfYC choice profiles as introduced in
Section 2.3.3 there is a DA-equivalent choice profile such that the DA-equivalent
market can be embedded into a Kelso-Crawford economy. There are three dif-
ferences between the result by Jagadeesan (2016) and earlier result by Echenique
(2012) that has been extended by Kominers (2012); Schlegel (2015):
1. The results apply to different domains of choice functions.
2. The result of Jagadeesan (2016) requires to first construct a DA-equivalent
choice profile. The embedding is then performed for a market where the
original choice profile is replaced by the equivalent choice profile. So his
embedding establishes an isomorphism between the deferred acceptance al-
gorithm in the original market and the salary adjustment process in the
Kelso-Crawford economy. In contrast to this, Echenique (2012) establishes a
full isomophism between the sets of stable allocations in the original market
and the Kelso-Crawford market.
3. Utility function in the Kelso-Crawford economy satisfy stronger regularity
conditions in Jagadeesan (2016). In Echenique (2012), monotonicity of utility
functions can only be achieved for salaries corresponding to “un-dominated”
contracts (see the discussion in Schlegel, 2015), whereas in Jagadeesan (2016)
monotonicity can be achieved for all salaries. Moreover, the utility functions
for firms can be chosen to be quasi-linear in salaries.
Thus, the notion of isomorphism of Jagadeesan (2016) is neither weaker (because
of 3.) nor stronger (because of 2.) than the one of Echenique (2012). In the
following, when we talk of a “embedding result” we mean embedding in the sense
of Jagadeesan (2016). Formally, an isomorphism in the sense of Jagadeesan,
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2016(see Definition C.2 in his paper) between a matching market with contracts
(Ch,) and a Kelso-Crawford-economy (Σ, u) is a bijection (f, w, σ) : C×S×T →
F ×W × Σ such that
1. for each x, x′ ∈ X , if x′C = xC then f(x) = f(x
′) and if xS = x
′
S then
w(x) = w(x′),
2. for each x, x′ ∈ X we have
x ≻xS x
′ ⇔ uw(x)(f(x), σ(x)) > uw(x)(f(x), σ(x))
and
x ≻xS ∅ ⇔ uw(x)(f(x), σ(x)) > uw(x)(∅),
3. for each c ∈ C and Y ⊆ Xc we have
Chc(Y ) = argmaxY ′⊆Y minuf(c)({(w(x), σ(x)) : x ∈ Y
′}),
4. for each (c, s, t) ∈ (C × S × T ) \ X , we have uw(c,s,t)(f(c, s, t), σ(c, s, t)) <
uw(c,s,t)(∅).
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With this definition we obtain the following result.
Corollary 7. For each choice profile Ch such that contracts are observable sub-
stitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds, there exists a DA-
equivalent choice profile Ch′, a finite set Σ ⊆ R++, utility functions (uc)c∈C, and
for each ∈×s∈SRs, utility functions (us)s∈S and an isomorphism in the sense
of Jagadeesan, 2016 between (Ch′,) and (Σ, u).
Proof. Let Ch be a profile such that contracts are observable substitutes and the
observable law of aggregate demand holds. By Theorem 5, there exist a DA-
equivalent profile Ch′ under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggre-
gate demand holds. Moreover, Ch′ can be chosen to be monotone in contract-
terms. It can be shown that a choice function Ch′c satisfying IRC can be rational-
ized by a strict preference relation ′c over Ac (see e.g.Alva, 2018). W.l.o.g. the
representation can be chosen such that for allocations Y, Y ′ ∈ Ac, if Y ⊆ Y
′ and
Chc(Y
′) = Y the only allocations ranked between Y and Y ′ according to ′c are
subsets of Y ′. Note that then in particular ′c can be chosen to be monotone in
contracts terms, i.e. such that for allocation Y, Y ′ ∈ Ac, Y 6= Y
′ with YS = Y
′
S we
have that yTDy
′
T for each y ∈ Y and y
′ ∈ Y ′ with yS = y
′
S implies Y
′ ′c Y : Indeed
note that by monotonicity in contract-terms of Ch′c, we have Ch
′
c(Y ∪ Y
′) ⊆ Y ′
14This item is not required in Jagadeesan (2016), as he only considers situations in which there
is the same number of contracts between any college and student.
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and by the prior assumption that the only allocations ranked between Y ′ and
Ch′c(Y ∪Y
′) are subsets of Y ′, we either have Y ≻′c Ch
′
c(Y ∪Y
′) or Y ′ ≻′c Y . Since
′c rationalizes Ch
′
c, the first cannot be the case, hence Y
′ ≻′c Y .
Now let F = C,W = S,Σ = {1, . . . , |T |}. For each c ∈ C and s ∈ S let x be
the ⊲-maximal contract in X with xC = c and xS = s and define f(x) = c, w(x) =
s, σ(x) = T . Similarly for the ⊲-maximal contract x′ in X ⊆ {x} with xC = c
and xS = s and define f(x) = c, w(x) = s, σ(x) = T − 1 and so on. If there are
less than |T | contracts between c and s extend the bijection arbitrarily. For each
c ∈ F = C, we can choose uc to be any monotonic utility representation such that
for allocations Y, Y ′ ∈ Ac we have
Y ≻′c Y
′ :⇔ uc({(w(x), σ(x)) : x ∈ Y }) > uc({(w(x
′), σ(x′)) : x′ ∈ Y ′}),
and for s ∈ W = S we can choose us to be any monotonic utility representation
such that for x, x′ ∈ Xs we have
x ≻s x
′ ⇔ us(f(x), σ(x)) > us(f(x), σ(x))
and
x ≻s ∅ ⇔ us(f(x), σ(x)) > us(∅).
Remark 2. While we use the same notion of isomorphism as Jagadeesan (2016),
we do not assume quasi-linearity of firm utility functions in the Kelso-Crawford
economy. In this sense our result is weaker. However, our result applies to a larger
domain of choice functions.
3.4 Applications
3.4.1 Job matching with salaries
In a Kelso-Crawford economy where firms’ utility functions are quasi-linear in
salaries, our Theorem 5, can be simplified considerably. Quasi-linearity implies
the following invariance property of the choice function: A choice function satisfies
demand-invariance if for Z ⊆ Y ⊆ Xc such that Zs = Ys for s /∈ Chc(Z)S,
we have Chc(Y )S = Chc(Z)S. A direct consequence of this property is that the
equivalent choice profile in Theorem 5, can be chosen to be the original profile.
More generally this proposition holds for monotone choice functions satisfying
demand invariance.
Proposition 8. If a choice function is induced by quasi-linear preferences, the
choice function and the virtual choice function is the same. In particular, if a
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profile Ch of choice functions induced by quasi-linear preferences is DA-equivalent
to a profile Ch′ such that contracts under Ch′ are substitutes, then we can choose
Ch′ = Ch.
Proof. Observe that by monotonicity of Chc in contract terms, we have Cc(Y ) =
Cc(U(Y )). By construction, Y
∨ ⊆ U(Y ) and Y ∨s = U(Y )s for s /∈ Chc(Y
∨)S.
Thus, by demand invariance Chc(Y
∨)S = Chc(U(Y ))S = Chc(Y )S, and hence by
monotonicity of Chc in contract terms, Ch
′
c(Y ) = Chc(Y ) ⊆ Y
min.
We obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 9. For a discrete quasi-linear Kelso-Crawford economies without ties,
gross substitutable valuations form a maximal cartesian domain of valuations for
the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanism.
Proof. By Proposition 8 and Theorem 5, for each substitutable valuation profile
there exists a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism. For the opposite di-
rection note that the proof of Theorem 1 in Hatfield et al. (2018) can be slightly
modified such that the constructed unit demand choice functions are induced by
quasi-linear valuations.
Remark 3. In a continuous Kelso-Crawford model with quasi-linear utility for
firms, substitutable valuations do not only form a maximal domain of valuations for
the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism, but also for the existence
for a stable allocation. (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999) See the example in Appendix A
of Schlegel (2018).
3.4.2 College admission with stipends
For a choice function from the class defined by Hassidim et al. (2017), the virtual
choice function can be defined as follows: The choice Chc(Y ) of college c from
Y ⊆ Xc is constructed iteratively. Consider the student s who is ranked top
according to ≫c in YS and choose the contract with the smallest stipend with i in
Y that does not make the choice violate the quota. Remove, all contracts with i
from Y and iterate.
Observe that, in the language of Hassidim et al. (2017), the virtual choice func-
tion prioritizes merit over need in college admission. This highlights the fundamen-
tal trade-off in Hassidim et al. (2017): if stability and (group)-strategy-proofness
are required the mechanism behaves necessarily, by our equivalence result, like a
mechanisms that assigns seats based on merit only (as encoded in the master list)
and keeps stipends as low as possible independently of the applicant.
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3.4.3 Cadet-to-branch matching
For the cadet-to-branch matching problem, Jagadeesan (2016) has constructed
DA-equivalent choice profile for the BfYC choice profiles of So¨nmez (2013).
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